

On October 29, 2005, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs (collectively known as the Security Consultative Committee, SCC) capped nearly 3 years of intense discussions about the structure of the most important U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific. They signed the Security Consultative Committee Document, *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*.¹ Unofficially known as the ATARA Report, this document details the roles, missions, and capabilities that both countries have agreed must be improved to strengthen their partnership. Most significantly, it

outlines the strategic foundations for the alliance and provides operational-level guidance to further the partnership in support of the National Security Strategy and the four priority areas outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Following the success of the report, the SCC presented a more detailed roadmap of alliance transformation on May 1, 2006, which reflected several months of consultations at the working level between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Forces, Japan, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Department of State and their Japanese counterparts. This roadmap contained detailed implementation plans to achieve the goals set out in the ATARA Report.

Forces of Regional Instability

Historically, the U.S.-Japan alliance has provided a bulwark against regional instability. Whether through containing communism or providing for free navigation of the seas so commercial shipping could thrive, the United States has always been considered the honest broker in the region and has been called on countless times to provide assistance for disasters, stem the spread of organized crime and illicit activities such as piracy, defend friends and allies from attack, or take action to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Throughout the postwar era, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable to supporting American operations across the theater.

Nevertheless, the threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region persists. Several factors

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The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Sustaining the Transformation

By BRUCE A. WRIGHT and MARK O. HAGUE

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USS Kitty Hawk enters Truman Bay in Yokosuka, Japan, after participating in Exercise Valiant Shield 2006

U.S. Navy (Larod Hodge)

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 2007	2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Sustaining the Transformation			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Air Force, Japan,			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 6	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Washington must maintain a forward presence to reassure friends and allies of its ability to respond to crises

have created strategic uncertainty: uneven economic development, unresolved territorial disputes, resource competition, environmental degradation, overpopulation, rising nationalism, great power rivalry, and a sense of history that has left many countries feeling victimized (either from colonialism or aggression in World War II).²

Furthermore, the diversity of cultures, languages, religions, and economic and political systems poses enormous challenges to devising a common value system on which to build any type of multilateral security structure. Past efforts at building these types of institutions, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, have foundered, and the incremental progress of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum underscores the continuing reluctance of area nations to commit to large-scale security cooperation. The result has been a security framework centered on bilateral ties and alliances with the United States.

The strategic geography of the Asia-Pacific region also shapes the security environment. The most economically successful countries, Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), lie on the coast or in the littoral. Their growth and survival are tied to the trade that passes over the sea lanes. With the exception of Japan, these nations were too small to develop navies that could protect trade routes and have relied on U.S. naval and air presence to underwrite their security.³ However, the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean imposes a tyranny of distance that precludes forces in the continental United States from rapidly deploying to the region in a crisis. To maintain an effective military presence in Asia and honor alliance commitments there, Washington must maintain a forward presence to reassure friends and allies of its ability to respond to crises and dissuade others from acting in ways that harm U.S. interests.

Importance of Japan

The enduring U.S. interest in the region is to maintain peace and stability so nations can flourish economically, socially,



Secretaries of State and Defense, flanked by Japanese Ministers for Defense and Foreign Affairs, at Pentagon press briefing

DOD (James M. Bowman)

and politically. To this end, Japan is a committed ally and partner. It shares the American commitment to democratic values, free and fair trade, respect for human rights, and rule of law, standing as a counterpoint to those who claim that democracy is both destabilizing and incompatible with Asian values. This shared value system has helped shape Japan's view of its national interests and provided the foundation for an alliance that has persisted for more than 50 years.

As the world's second largest economy, Japan has the financial and technological potential to make great contributions to international security. Tokyo already pays \$4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S. forces, over 2.5 times what the next closest country remits and half of the total direct and indirect cost-sharing assistance received from all U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Pacific, and Gulf Cooperation Council allies combined in 2003.⁴ It also includes funding for an educated and dedicated workforce of Japanese nationals who not only provide labor but who also, as an added benefit, help bridge the linguistic and cultural barriers between the U.S. military and its hosts.

Vast wealth and technological advancement also hold the potential for greater interoperability with U.S. forces. Japan currently has \$8 billion of foreign military sales cases open with the United States and spends nearly \$1 billion a year on American equipment. As the third largest purchaser of U.S.-made military gear (behind Egypt and Saudi Arabia),⁵ Japan purchases, produces, or codevelops at least 28 major weapons systems, such

as the F-15 Eagle, Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3, Apache helicopter, and the Aegis Shipboard Air Defense System. Japan was also the first ally to invest heavily in ballistic missile defense (BMD) and will codevelop the next generation of the SM-3 missile and associated radars and fire control systems—all key components of U.S. BMD architecture.

Most importantly, Japan provides bases for stationing and deploying over 50,000 uniformed personnel from all Service components. Its location in the Asian littoral places the U.S. Armed Forces in a position to project power over the ocean trade routes, which are the economic lifeline of the region, and also serves as an access point to South and Southeast Asia, critical regions in the war on terror. A strong American presence acts as a deterrent against those who would upset the status quo through aggression and reassures Japan and other nations who have come to view the U.S. presence in Asia as a stabilizing force.

Evolution of the Alliance

One of the greatest strengths of the U.S.-Japan alliance is its continued evolution to meet the challenges of a shifting strategic landscape. World War II left Japan without any military forces and no legal authority to establish a defense capability. This soon changed as events on the Korean Peninsula drove the United States into another war. In 1950, the occupation authorities in Japan recognized the threat to Japanese interests posed by the communist forces on the peninsula and established the National Police

Reserve, which later evolved into the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF).

Since the inception of the SDF, Washington and Tokyo have reached a series of benchmarks, both bilaterally and unilaterally. The countries updated their security relationship in 1960 by signing the current security treaty, which includes the imperatives of defending Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Far East. The U.S. military relationship was further defined in 1978 when the Security Consultative Committee signed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. These principles focused the alliance on the defense of Japan and established a division of labor called the *Shield and Spear* concept, in which the SDF would defend the homeland (acting as the shield), while the United States would take the fight beyond Japanese territory (the spear). These guidelines opened the door for formal bilateral training and planning.

Japan dispatched its Maritime SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf at the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. This was the first time the SDF was allowed to operate beyond territorial waters and paved the way for participation in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia the following year—and the first time since World War II that Japanese ground troops operated outside the country. Since then, the SDF has continued to contribute to UN efforts by dispatching soldiers to Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda, East Timor, Honduras, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the simmering tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and Japan updated previous agreements on role-sharing by signing the New Defense Guidelines in 1997. These rules marked a shift in focus from the Cold War imperative of defending Japan to a shared commitment to maintaining peace and security in the Far East. Tokyo agreed

to provide logistic support and perform search and rescue and maritime inspection operations in rear areas to assist U.S. military operations around Japan.⁶ These guidelines also provided for a more robust bilateral coordination mechanism and more detailed bilateral planning.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Tokyo passed the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law in October of that year, permitting the SDF to deploy ships to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Shaping the Alliance

As the United States and Japan entered the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region faced strategic uncertainty. The attacks on the World Trade Center brought nontraditional threats to the forefront, yet traditional military rivalries and historic animosities persisted. North Korea, moreover, continued to defy the world in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. These developments called for a renewed look at the alliance.

In December 2002, the SCC directed a review of both nations' defense and security policies. Known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), this study included an analysis of the global security environment; discussion of bilateral roles, missions, capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperation in missile defense and efforts to confront regional challenges. The DPRI process allowed both countries to reaffirm the value of the alliance and reshape it to ensure its relevance for the foreseeable future.

On February 19, 2005, the allies agreed on a set of common strategic objectives, which encompassed a variety of security challenges that threatened regional and global peace and

the New Defense Guidelines marked a shift from the Cold War imperative of defending Japan to maintaining security in the Far East

stability. Issues addressed at the SCC level included closer cooperation in missile defense, combating terrorism, and resolving the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Both nations also called for the peaceful resolution of "issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" and encouraged China to improve the transparency of its military affairs. The SCC committed to holding regular consultations to coordinate policies and objectives.⁷

Following this meeting, U.S. and Japanese leaders began a comprehensive review of the roles, missions, and capabilities that each country should pursue in support of common strategic objectives. The results of this study were approved by the SCC on October 29, 2005, and published in the ATARA Report. This document reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to both countries and addressed two fundamental issues: force posture realignment and the roles, missions, and capabilities each side would need to respond to diverse challenges.

Force Posture Realignment

American military bases in Japan provide the USPACOM commander with enormous flexibility and strategic access to the Asia-Pacific region. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is the largest American airbase outside of the continental United States, the Navy's only forward deployed aircraft carrier calls Yokusuka Naval Base home, and one of the Marine Corps' III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) is located in Okinawa. Aside from these critical forces, there are more than 80 other military facilities of various sizes.

As important as these bases are, they reflect a force structure designed to address



Marine conducts amphibious training with Ground Self-Defense Force soldiers at Coronado, California

U.S. Navy (Erich J. Ryland)



Air Self-Defense Force aircrew conducts postflight inspection of F-4EJ in Guam, Exercise Cope North 05-02

36th Communication Squadron (Bennie J. Davis III)



Navy officer briefs members of Tokyo Metropolitan Government aboard USS Gary on disaster preparedness

U.S. Navy (Paul J. Phelps)

Secretary Rumsfeld meeting with Minister of State for Defense at Pentagon



Fleet Combat Camera, Pacific (Chad J. McNealey)

Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visiting American Memorial Park in Saipan



U.S. Navy (Nathanael T. Miller)

past threats, not future challenges. Additionally, some were originally in rural areas. Urban sprawl, especially near Tokyo and in Okinawa, eventually brought residential neighborhoods to the front gates. Routine training became an irritant to the alliance in some areas as residents complained of noise and other degradations in the quality of life.

Through the DPRI, the SCC embarked on an ambitious program to create an enduring presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including Guam, reducing the burden on local communities while repositioning U.S. forces to respond better to regional crises. Certain measures were specified:

- The headquarters of III MEF will relocate to Guam. A Marine air-ground task force will remain in Okinawa. Additionally, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma will be replaced by a new facility at Camp Schwab, thus relocating the majority of tactical aircraft that support III MEF far from urban areas to reduce noise complaints and allay local fears of mishaps. These moves will also allow the Marines to consolidate their forces in northern Okinawa, away from the urbanized south.

- Carrier Air Wing 5, part of the USS *Kitty Hawk* battlegroup, will relocate to Iwakuni MCAS, moving its jet aircraft out of Tokyo's crowded Kanto Plain. The *Kitty Hawk* battlegroup will remain forward deployed in Yokosuka, and the Navy will maintain some capability in Atsugi. The *Kitty Hawk*, the Navy's sole remaining conventionally powered aircraft carrier, will be replaced by the nuclear-powered USS *George Washington* in 2008.

- U.S. Army Japan at Camp Zama will be transformed into a joint task force-capable, deployable headquarters that is part of the U.S.

Army I Corps, providing the USPACOM commander with another forward-deployed, crisis response option in the theater.

- The Air Self-Defense Force will collocate its air defense command headquarters with the headquarters of U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Tokyo, strengthening bilateral ballistic missile defense command and control and shared early warning systems.

- Japan agreed to provide land and facilities in northern Japan to support the deployment of an X-band radar, the first time since 1985 the country has provided space and infrastructure to the U.S. military for a new facility.⁸

Interoperability

Interoperability covers the spectrum of military conflict from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level. At the strategic level, it encompasses issues such as crisis management and decisionmaking, intelligence exchange, budgeting, capacities of the defense industrial base, and the legal and policy frameworks that provide a nation's leaders the authority to mobilize assets in support of national security objectives.

At the operational level, interoperability focuses on cooperation between national military forces and includes such areas as combined or bilateral command and control, combined and interagency planning, basing and force posture, and organizing bilateral or multinational forces to leverage the capabilities that the militaries of each nation possess. At the tactical level, interoperability efforts primarily focus on bilateral and multilateral training, where military units practice operating together in a variety of contingencies.

To maintain regional peace and stability, U.S. and allied forces must be postured

strategically and linked operationally to dissuade, deter, and, when necessary, defeat threats. Restructuring bases within Japan will better position forces there to respond to contingencies and crises in the region and increase interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. In some cases, such as in Camp Zama and Yokota Air Base, American and SDF units will be collocated, providing unprecedented opportunities to train together and increase interoperability.

Alliance transformation, however, is not limited to real estate. The effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance will ultimately be measured by how the two militaries can achieve common objectives through a variety of regional and global activities, not by the location of U.S. bases within Japan. Defining the roles, missions, and capabilities each force should bring to a contingency, then developing those capabilities through bilateral training, is essential to a more capable alliance. Missile defense, countering WMD proliferation, bilateral training and exercises, and strengthening Tokyo's role in regional and global affairs are among the most significant issues being addressed.

Missile Defense

Protecting the homeland from direct attack is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces and the highest priority of the national defense strategy. U.S. and Japanese efforts at missile defense in Japan form the frontline protection against missiles directed at both countries from continental Asia.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) fired a Taepodong missile over Japan unannounced in 1998. This incident, described by North Korea as a failed satellite launch, was a stark reminder that Japan is well

within the range of North Korean missiles yet has no protection. After that incident, the Japanese government began a series of studies on missile defense and in December 2003 decided to pursue a missile defense capability that included close cooperation with the United States on operational matters and research on BMD systems.

Both allies reaffirmed their commitment to BMD at the two-plus-two meetings in February and October of 2005. They also agreed to base an American X-band radar in Japan that will be able to search and track missiles directed at either country. Aegis warships and Patriot PAC-3 batteries, both Japanese and American, will provide area and point defenses to critical infrastructure and military bases within Japan.

This close bilateral coordination in missile defense paid dividends in July 2006, when Kim Jong Il again attempted to use his ballistic missiles to intimidate Japan and position his regime as a global military power. Unlike in 1998, however, the U.S.-Japan alliance was at a much improved level of readiness and detected the DPRK missile activity. The U.S. security establishment identified seven missile launches as they occurred. One of the tested missiles was a Taepodong, which failed soon after launch.

The close bilateral and interagency coordination between Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan; the Japan Defense Agency; Japan Joint Staff Office; and the American Embassy provided the senior leadership of both allies the opportunity to meet on the world stage with timely, reliable, and coordinated information, which ultimately defeated Pyongyang's efforts to surprise the world. In fact, these ballistic missile launches by North Korea have substantially strengthened Japanese public support for the security alliance and paved the way for additional domestic spending on bilateral missile defense systems.

The July 2006 missile launches highlighted the importance of sharing missile defense data to ensure situational awareness. A vital element of this exchange will be an air and missile defense coordination center collocated with the U.S. Forces, Japan, headquarters at Yokota Air Base.⁹ This key command node will act as the nerve center for future joint and bilateral military activities in Japan, enabling U.S. and Japanese commanders to interact face

U.S. and Japanese efforts at missile defense in Japan form the frontline protection against missiles directed at both countries from continental Asia

to face, conduct coordination, and provide direction for all bilateral military activities.

At the heart of this center will be a robust multilink communications node that will fuse information on land, sea, air, and space operations into one all-encompassing operational picture. This facility will ensure rapid, bilateral decisionmaking, gaining Japanese and U.S. forces the time to react to a variety of crises, including a ballistic missile attack.¹⁰

Counterproliferation

Given its history as the only nation ever attacked with nuclear weapons, and having been victimized by domestic terrorists spreading Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, Japan has positioned itself on the diplomatic moral high ground in its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery devices. Its proximity to North Korea, which withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and has a history of proliferating missiles, only intensifies the threat it feels and helps keep nonproliferation at the top of the national agenda.

A key area for U.S.-Japanese cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Japan was one of the first signatories. In October 2004, the SDF led Team Samurai '04, an exercise that brought together 22 countries and provided a venue for practicing national crisis management, command and control, and maritime interdiction.¹¹ Such operations are crucial in increasing the interoperability of nations involved in counterproliferation.

Bilateral Training and Exercises

To ensure the viability of the alliance, U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan must operationalize the strategies established at SCC meetings through a robust program that includes bilateral exercises in Japan, as well as SDF drills and training in the United States and Guam. Tokyo has committed to making changes in training infrastructure, enhancing the value of training, and dispersing training more broadly throughout Japan's communities.

Each of the U.S. Service components has rigorous bilateral training programs with their Japanese counterparts that reflect their unique mission sets and capabilities. Both

the Navy and Air Force require airspace to train tactical aircraft, and the Navy must also conduct field aircraft carrier landing practice. Under the new alliance structure, U.S. pilots may utilize airspace previously used only by Japanese pilots and have access to new Air SDF ground facilities. Airspace around the Kanto Plain and Iwakuni will be adjusted to accommodate the move of the carrier air wing, and Japan renewed its pledge to find a permanent base for Navy pilots to conduct field carrier and night landing practice, replacing the current site at Iwo Jima.

The Ground SDF will collocate its Central Readiness Force (CRF) headquarters with U.S. Army I Corps at Camp Zama. The CRF is a newly created major command in the Ground SDF that has administrative control over all special operations units and the mission of preparing Japanese forces for overseas peacekeeping duties. Positioning the CRF in Camp Zama will increase the training opportunities, liaison, and interoperability between this important headquarters and I Corps. Additionally, the U.S. Army will build a battle-command training center at the nearby Sagami Depot, which will have state-of-the-art computer simulations to enhance the bilateral training and readiness of both I Corps and its counterpart headquarters in the Ground SDF.

At the operational level, the key training that pulls all the elements of the various SCC reports together is the bilateral Exercise Keen Edge, conducted between U.S. Forces, Japan, and the Japan Joint Staff Office. Held every other year, Keen Edge tests the limits of the joint operating systems of U.S. Forces, Japan, in a bilateral, joint, and interagency environment. During the latest exercise in February 2005, 102 officers from the Joint Staff Office participated at Yokota Air Base, and 36 operated out of the Bilateral Coordination Center. Keen Edge both validated the roles, missions, and capabilities described in the ATARA Report and highlighted the work still needed to move the alliance forward. Another exercise is scheduled for January 2007 to maintain the momentum and build on lessons learned in previous exercises.

Japan's Leadership Role

In the postwar era, Japan has grown from a defeated and devastated nation to an economic powerhouse. The rise from the ashes of war was due to a variety of factors: a shared value system with the United States that prioritized democracy, rule of law,

capitalism, and free trade; integration in the global marketplace; and a long era of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. As a beneficiary of the current international system, Japan has an obligation to help provide peace and stability not just in the region but also throughout the world. As its alliance with America matures and SDF capabilities increase, Japan will be able to assume a greater leadership role in the region and contribute more toward a stable international environment.

Tokyo faces tough challenges. A declining birthrate and aging society are predicted to put downward pressure on economic growth for at least the next 10 years, and an unresolved historical legacy undermines its military legitimacy with many, but not all, countries in the region. Myriad laws restricting Japan's use of force, all stemming from interpretations of its constitution, effectively limit the Japanese to exercising soft power (that is, creating policies or programs that attract others due to appeal rather than threats). Within these constraints, however, there are activities that can help Tokyo to exercise regional and global leadership.

Participation in international peacekeeping operations is an example. Since it deployed its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1992, the SDF has proven to be a professional and effective force, albeit in a noncombat role, providing engineering expertise, logistic support, and disaster relief supplies throughout the world. Since then it has supported more peacekeeping and international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations and has over 500 SDF members supporting UN reconstruction in Iraq.

Each time the SDF deploys and brings relief supplies to people who are suffering or otherwise improves the area it deploys to, it gains the moral high ground by refuting arguments that Japan is a revanchist military power. In many ways, its actions in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief

operations reflect national values, and any rational review of Japan's postwar military activities would conclude that the country is a fully democratic nation-state in complete control of its forces and free from the urge of military domination.

The alliance transformation effort under way in Japan will change the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance in ways never thought possible just a decade ago. The momentum established through the Defense Policy Review Initiative process will strengthen what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has described as a "pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific region" as both nations move toward a more mature security partnership in which they field increasingly integrated and balanced alliance capabilities.

Postscript

On October 9, 2006, North Korea attempted to enter the ranks of the nuclear power states by announcing that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Described by Secretary Rice as "provocative" and condemned by nearly all of the world's leaders, this act served to highlight the volatility of the region as it prompted many of

North Korea's neighbors to reassess their policies regarding the nation. It also underscored the importance of maintaining a strong forward presence in Northeast Asia. The U.S.-Japan

alliance serves a dual purpose of providing a credible deterrent that Kim Jong Il must consider if he continues to develop a nuclear capability further and reassuring our allies in the region of the continued U.S. commitment to their defense, including coverage under our extended nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, Kim's provocation further strengthened Japan's public support for the security alliance that their leaders have supported for more than 45 years. **JFQ**

as a beneficiary of the current international system, Japan has the obligation to help provide stability not just in the region but also throughout the world



Highest ranking Japanese special forces officer talks to U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal unit

U.S. Navy (Jeremie Yoder)

¹ Security Consultative Committee Document, *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, October 29, 2005, available at <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.

² See, for example, Robert G. Sutter, *China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia* (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006), 26–27.

³ See John R. Landry, "The Military Dimensions of Great-Power Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional Realities*, ed. Paul D. Taylor (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2001), 83–86.

⁴ In 2003, Japan's host nation support covered nearly 75 percent of U.S. basing costs in Japan. See *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions Support to the Common Defense*, available at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf>.

⁵ Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), *Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency Facts Book* (Washington, DC: DSCA Administration and Management Business Operations, September 30, 2004), 3–11, available at <www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/2004_facts/facts%20book%202004.pdf>.

⁶ The area in which Japan can provide this support has not been geographically delineated and is conceptual in nature. See *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, available at <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>. See also Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2005), 162–171, available at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm>.

⁷ See "Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," February 19, 2005, available at <<http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/tp-20050219-77.html>>.

⁸ In 1985, the government provided 214 acres for the Haruo housing area near Sasebo Navy Base.

⁹ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, Summary, available at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm>.

¹⁰ For an overview of the operational and technical challenges of fielding a missile defense system, see M. Elaine Bunn, *Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges*, Strategic Forum 209 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, August 2004), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF209/SF209.pdf>.

¹¹ Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, "Japanese Regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Team Samurai '04)," October 22, 2004, available at <www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/37371.htm>. For a perspective from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise 'Team Samurai 04' (Overview and Evaluation)," October 28, 2004, available at <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0410.html>.